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Construction Law
by Frank 0. Brown, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article focuses on noteworthy construction law opinions by
Georgia appellate courts between June 1, 2012 and May 31, 2013, and
one case, Estate of Pitts v. City of Atlanta, decided on remand in July
2013.' The Article briefly discusses the Georgia False Claims Act,'
which became effective July 1, 2012.'
II. CONTRIBUTION
In Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Heard,' the owner of a hotel
contended that the general contractor and architect were jointly and
severally liable for damage to the hotel.' The general contractor and
architect separately settled for $2,300,000 and $100,000, respectively.
The insurers for the general contractor, as subrogees for covered claims
and assignees of the general contractor on uncovered claims, then sued
the architect and its subcontractor engineer for contribution and other
claims.'
The State Court of Fulton County granted summary judgment to the
defendants for several stated reasons, including that after the enactment
of section 51-12-33(b) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated

* Shareholder in the firm of Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
General Counsel for Greater Atlanta Home Builders Association, Inc. Rhodes College
(BA., 1976); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. 323 Ga. App. 70, 746 S.E.2d 698 (2013).
2. O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-120 to -127 (Supp. 2013).
3. Id. For an analysis of Georgia construction law during the prior survey period, see
Frank 0. Brown, Jr., ConstructionLaw, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 64 MERCER L. REV.
71 (2012).
4. 321 Ga. App. 325, 740 S.E.2d 429 (2013).
5. Id. at 327, 740 S.E.2d at 431.
6. Id. at 327-28, 740 S.E.2d at 431-32.
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(O.C.G.A.), one settling joint tortfeasor can no longer get contribution
from another joint tortfeasor.' The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) precludes contribution only when a
trier of fact has apportioned damages between joint tortfeasors, not when
parties have settled.9
III. LIABILITY INSURANCE
In Hoover v. Maxum Indemnity Co.,1o an employee of a water extraction company was injured while assisting an independent contractor
with its roofing work." About two years later, the employee sued his
employer, and the employer notified its insurer of the suit. The insurer
sent a letter to the employer denying coverage and asserting a defense
to the suit based on the policy's Employer's Liability Exclusion. It also
purported to reserve other defenses, including lack of timely notice of the
injury itself."
The Georgia Supreme Court held that the insurer could not reserve
other defenses, including the notice defense, while denying coverage and
asserting a defense of the insured based on the Employer's Liability
Exclusion.13 According to the court,
A reservation of rights is a term of art in insurance vernacular and is
designed to allow an insurer to provide a defense to its insured while
still preserving the option of litigating and ultimately denying coverage. ... Thus, a reservation of rights is only available to an insurer
who undertakes a defense while questions remain about the validity of

the coverage."'
"When an insurer is presented with notice of a claim and demand for a
defense, the 'proper and safe course of action ...

is to enter upon a

defense under a reservation of rights and then proceed to seek a
declaratory judgment in its favor.'""

7. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-33(b) (Supp. 2013).
8. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 321 Ga. App. at 329, 740 S.E.2d at 432.
9. Id. at 330, 740 S.E.2d at 432-33. However, see District Owners Ass'n v. AMEC
Environmental & Infrastructure,Inc., 322 Ga. App. 713, 747 S.E.2d 10 (2013), where the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court order dismissing a third-party contribution/apportionment claim. Id.
10. 291 Ga. 402, 730 S.E.2d 413 (2012).
11. Id. at 403, 730 S.E.2d at 415.
12. Id. at 403-04, 730 S.E.2d at 415-16.
13. Id. at 405, 730 S.E.2d at 416-17.
14. Id. at 405, 730 S.E.2d at 416.
15. Id. at 405, 730 S.E.2d at 417 (quoting Richmond v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.,
140 Ga. App. 215, 217, 231 S.E.2d 245, 247 (1976)).
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The court also held that the insurer's denial letter failed to effectively
reserve the notice defense because it did not "unambiguously inform" the
insured that the insurer "intended to pursue a defense based on
untimely notice of the claim."16 Instead, the letter merely stated that,
"coverage for this matter may be barred or limited to the extent the
insured has not complied with the notice provisions under the policy,"
and it included "boilerplate language" purporting to reserve the right to
assert numerous other defenses."
IV.

MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

In the case of 182 Tenth, LLC v. Manhattan Construction Co.,"s a

general contractor filed suit to collect a debt and to foreclose the related
mechanics' and materialmen's lien." The Georgia Court of Appeals
held that the contractor's itemized general conditions costs for overhead
or administrative costs during the construction project (such as the cost
of staff, mobilization, phone and water, power, a job-site trailer,
dumpster rentals, the final cleaning, and builder's risk and generalliability insurance) were not lienable because they did not actually
become part of the property.o For the same reason, it also held that
interest on these costs was not lienable.2 1
In response to this decision, the Georgia legislature amended O.C.G.A.
§ 44-14-36122 to allow liens to include general conditions costs to the
extent they are permitted by an express or implied contract or purchase
order,23 and to provide that mechanics' and materialmen's liens "shall
include interest on the principal amount due in accordance with Code
Section 7-4-2 or 7-4-16."24
V. STATUTES OF LIMITATION
In Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc. v. Jordan Jones & Goulding,
Inc.,25 the owner of an automobile shredding facility sued its designing

16. Id. at 406, 730 S.E.2d at 417.
17. Id. at 404, 406, 730 S.E.2d at 416-17. The court also held that the insurer waived
the notice defense by not asserting it at earlier stages. Id. at 407, 730 S.E.2d at 418.
18. 316 Ga. App. 776, 730 S.E.2d 495 (2012).
19. Id. at 776, 730 S.E.2d at 497.
20. Id. at 780-81, 730 S.E.2d at 500.
21. Id. at 781, 730 S.E.2d at 500.
22. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361 (2002 & Supp. 2013).
23. Ga. H.R. Bill 434, Reg. Sess., 2013 Ga. Laws 1102 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(c)).
24. Id. (codified at O.C.GA § 44-14-361(d)).
25. 317 Ga. App. 464, 731 S.E.2d 361 (2012).
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engineering firm for breach of contract and professional malpractice.26
The engineering firm sought summary judgment on the basis that the
suit was barred by the four-year statute of limitation in O.C.G.A. § 9-32527 for express oral promises.28 The owner responded that two cover
letters from the engineering firm and an enclosed draft scope of work
amounted to a written contract, which, according to O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24,"
is subject to a six-year statute of limitations.30 The owner also noted
that one of the letters included cost estimates for the first three stages
of work and stated that the engineering firm would bill on an hourly
basis. The Superior Court of Gwinnett County granted summary
judgment to the engineering firm." The Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed, noting that to be considered a written contract under O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-24, all of the contract's essential terms had to be stated in, or be
ascertainable from, the writings.32 The court concluded that because
the essential contract element of consideration was lacking from the
cover letters and draft scope of work, the writings did not specify the
hourly rate."
The owner also argued that an invoice from the engineering firm,
about four months after the letters and draft scope, cured that deficiency
because the court could calculate the hourly rates from the invoice.'
The court rejected the argument by noting that, while a written contract
can arise from several writings, those writings have to be contemporaneous. 35
In the case of CarrierCorp. v. Rollins, Inc.," the contract between an
HVAC installer and a property owner stated that the owner had to file
any suit within one year from "the date the claim arose."
The
contract did not define that phrase. The installer moved for a directed
verdict on the basis that "substantial completion" of the contract had
occurred about two years before the owner filed suit.3" On appeal from
the denial of the installer's motion and other rulings, the Georgia Court

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 464, 731 S.E.2d at 363.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 (2007).
Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc., 317 Ga. App. at 465, 731 S.E.2d at 363.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 (2007).
Newell Recycling of Atlanta, Inc., 317 Ga. App. at 464, 467, 731 S.E.2d at 363-64.
Id. at 464, 466, 731 S.E.2d at 362, 364.
See id. at 464, 731 S.E.2d at 362.
Id. at 467, 731 S.E.2d at 364.
Id.
Id. at 466-67, 731 S.E.2d at 364.
316 Ga. App. 630, 730 S.E.2d 103 (2012).
Id. at 632, 730 S.E.2d at 107.
Id. at 632-33, 730 S.E.2d at 106-07.
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of Appeals noted that generally a cause of action for breach of a
construction contract accrues at substantial completion of the project."
However, it held that the suit was timely because (1) the contract did
not mention substantial completion and used the term "complete
operational system" to describe the project; and (2) the system was either
never completed or was completed within a year from when the owner
filed suit."0
VI.

"PAY-IF-PAID" PROVISIONS

In Vratsinas Construction Co. v. 7iad Drywall, LLC," the contract
between a drywall subcontractor and the general contractor contained
a pay-if-paid provision. 42 According to the subcontractor, after it
expressed concerns to the general contractor about the owner's ability to
pay, the general contractor told it not to worry, to continue working, and
that the general contractor would pay the subcontractor from its "own
pocket" if necessary. The general contractor did pay the subcontractor's
next application even though the owner had not paid the general
contractor. However, the general contractor refused to pay the
subcontractor's next seven applications because it had not received
payment from the owner. After completion of the project, the owner filed
bankruptcy.4
The subcontractor sued the general contractor arguing that it had
waived the pay-if-paid provision by committing to pay from its "own
pocket" and doing so in connection with one application for payment. A
jury returned a verdict for the subcontractor."
On appeal, the general contractor argued that the Superior Court of
Fulton County erred in denying its motions for directed verdict and
judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there was insufficient
evidence of waiver of the pay-if-paid provision." The Georgia Court of
Appeals stated that although waiver can occur by conduct, "the law will
not infer the waiver of an important contract right unless 'the waiver is
clear and unmistakable."'6 The court added, "[Blecause waiver is not
favored under the law, the evidence relied upon to prove a waiver 'must

39. Id. at 633, 730 S.E.2d at 107.
40. Id. at 633-34, 730 S.E.2d at 107-08.
41. 321 Ga. App. 451, 739 S.E.2d 493 (2013).
42. Id. at 452, 739 S.E.2d at 495.
43. Id. at 451-53, 739 S.E.2d at 494-95.
44. Id. at 453, 739 S.E.2d at 495-96.
45. Id. at 453, 739 S.E.2d at 496.
46. Id. at 453-54, 739 S.E.2d at 496 (quoting Accurate Printers, Inc. v. Stark, 295 Ga.
App. 172, 177, 671 S.E.2d 228, 232 (2008)).
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be so clearly indicative of an intent to relinquish a then[-]known
particular right or benefit as to exclude any other reasonable explanation."' According to the court, the party asserting waiver has the
burden of proving it."8
Applying those principles to the facts, the court held that there were
insufficient facts to establish waiver.49 In reaching that conclusion, it
emphasized that the general contractor had refused to pay the subcontractor's last seven applications, and the subcontractor's account
manager and co-owner were very aware of the pay-if-paid provision and
were unaware of any change in the applicability of that provision.so
VII.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

51
In Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Georgia Department of ransportation,
the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) contracted with
Applied Technical Services, Inc. (ATS) to test samples of asphalt laid by
Douglas Asphalt Company (Douglas).52 After the test results indicated
issues, and GDOT had declared Douglas in default on more than one
hundred projects and removed it from GDOT's bidders list, Douglas sued
ATS alleging that ATS had used an improper testing procedure. As part
of the consideration for settlement of that suit, ATS assigned its rights
against GDOT to Douglas.53
In the subject case, Douglas, as assignee of ATS, sued GDOT for
contract-based indemnification and contribution. GDOT asserted
sovereign immunity as a defense. The State Court of Glynn County
granted GDOT's motion to dismiss on that ground.14 The Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed on the indemnification claim because it
determined there was no agreement to indemnify in the documents that
Douglas contended constituted the ATS/GDOT contract.55 The court
also affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the contribution claim, noting
that contribution is only applicable between joint tortfeasors, and
determining that Douglas's claim sounded in contract, not tort.56 It
reached that conclusion because GDOT's duties to ATS relating to the

47. Id. at 454,739 S.E.2d at 496 (quoting D.I. Corbett Elec., Inc. v. Venture Constr. Co.,
140 Ga. App. 586, 588, 231 S.E.2d 536, 538 (1976)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 455-56, 739 S.E.2d at 497.
51. 319 Ga. App. 47, 735 S.E.2d 86 (2012).
52. Id. at 47, 735 S.E.2d at 88.
53. Id. at 47-48, 735 S.E.2d at 88-89.
54. Id. at 47, 735 S.E.2d at 88.
55. Id. at 50, 735 S.E.2d at 90.
56. Id. at 50-51, 735 S.E.2d at 90-91.
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testing procedures could only have arisen from a contract and not from
any duty imposed by law."
VIII.

THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES

The history of Archer Western Contractors,Ltd. v. Estate of Pitts's is
cautionary
tale to both drafters of construction contracts and litigation
a
counsel charged with trying to anticipate appellate court rulings. 9
During an airport construction project, a truck driven by an employee of
a sub-subcontractor fatally struck Pitts, a subcontractor's employee.60
Pitts's estate received a large judgment against the sub-subcontractor
and its employee, which exceeded the sub-subcontractor's automobile
liability insurance coverage. The estate then sued the City of Atlanta,
the general contractor, and the subcontractor, alleging that they had
failed to require the sub-subcontractor to maintain $10 million in
automobile liability insurance as required by both the general contract
and the subcontract. Had they required that level of insurance, the
estate argued, the judgment against the sub-subcontractor would have
been fully satisfied. The defendants responded that Pitts was not a
third-party beneficiary of the general contract or subcontract and,
therefore lacked standing to assert a breach of the minimum insurance
requirement.6 1
The Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged that neither contract
named Pitts as a third-party beneficiary, but it held that Pitts was
nevertheless an intended beneficiary.62 The court drew that conclusion
principally because of the following language in an insurance addendum
to the general contract, which the subcontracts also incorporated: [The
purpose of the Owner's Controlled Insurance Program is] "to provide one
master insurance program that provides broad coverages with high
limits that will benefit all participants involved in the project."63 The
court noted that the contracts did not define "participant," but concluded,

57. Id. at 51, 735 S.E.2d at 91. See also Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Linnenkohl, 320 Ga.
App. 427,430-31, 741 S.E.2d 169, 171(2013), where the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
sovereign immunity protected the GDOT commissioner from fraud claims by Douglas
relating to the testing procedures.
58. 292 Ga. 219, 735 S.E.2d 772 (2012), remanded to sub nom. Estate of Pitts v. City
of Atlanta, 323 Ga. App. 70, 746 S.E.2d 698 (2013).
59. See generally Archer W. Contractors,292 Ga. at 219, 735 S.E.2d at 772.
60. Estate of Pitts v. City of Atlanta, 312 Ga. App. 599, 599-600, 719 S.E.2d 7,9 (2011),
vacated and remanded by sub nom. Archer W. Contractors,292 Ga. at 219, 735 S.E.2d at
772.
61. Estate of Pitts,312 Ga. App. at 600, 719 S.E.2d at 10.
62. Id. at 602-03, 719 S.E.2d at 11-12.
63. Id. at 603, 719 S.E.2d at 12.
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based on what it characterized as the common meaning, that "participant" unambiguously referred to all persons involved in constructing the
project."
The Georgia Supreme Court accepted certiorari.6 ' The court's four-tothree majority opinion began by observing that, though the contract
addendum required the city to procure certain insurance policies and the
general contractor and subcontractors to procure other policies, including
the automobile insurance at issue, that addendum was "somewhat
confusingly, entitled 'Owner's Controlled Insurance Program' and [was]
referenced in the contract as 'OCIP.' 6 The supreme court referred to
the addendum as the "OCIP addendum."7
The majority stated that the court of appeals analysis had been
incomplete in two respects." First, in determining the meaning of "all
participants," it failed to consider fully the context in which that term
appeared in the OCIP addendum. More specifically, they opined that
the court of appeals should have more carefully examined whether
"OCIP," in the purpose statement mentioned above, referred only to the
coverages provided by the city or to all coverages addressed in the OCIP
addendum.o According to the majority, the second incompleteness in
the court of appeals analysis was that it seemed to assume the plaintiff
was a beneficiary of all insurance-related contract terms, rather than
analyzing and specifying whether the plaintiff was a beneficiary of terms
relating directly or indirectly to the automobile coverage."
The supreme court vacated the court of appeals decision and remanded
the case for consideration of these deficiencies, as well as unaddressed
parol evidence and alleged judicial admissions that could bear on
them.72 The dissenters aggressively criticized the majority opinion as
misguided and noted that the decision to remand was effectively
directing the court of appeals to "wander in the wilderness."7 While
not expressly reversing the court of appeals opinion relating to breach
of contract claims against the city, the supreme court effectively did so,
stating that "[t]o the extent that the Court of Appeals concluded," which
it had, that the city breached a duty to ensure that the sub-subcontrac-

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 603-04, 719 S.E.2d at 12.
Archer W. Contractors,292 Ga. at 220, 735 S.E.2d at 774.
Id. at 221-22, 735 S.E.2d at 775-76.
Id. at 222, 735 S.E.2d at 776.
Id. at 224, 735 S.E.2d at 777.
Id.
Id. at 225-26, 735 S.E.2d at 777-78.
Id. at 227-28, 735 S.E.2d at 779-80.
Id. at 230, 735 S.E.2d at 780-81.
Id. at 237, 735 S.E.2d at 785 (Hines, J., dissenting).
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tor carried at least $10 million in automobile liability insurance, "it
erred."04
On remand, the court of appeals again addressed the meaning of "all
participants."7 1 It characterized the supreme court's majority opinion
as having determined that this term was ambiguous and as having
directed the court of appeals to determine whether that ambiguity could
be resolved as a matter of law.76 The court of appeals quoted key provisions of the OCIP addendum that were not fully quoted in earlier
opinions and were helpful in understanding the OCIP addendum.7 It
then considered various arguments and evidence relating to the meaning
of "all participants," and, after applying rules of contract construction,
once again concluded that "all participants" included Pitts as a matter
of law.78
The court of appeals next identified, per the supreme court's direction,
the specific provisions of the contract, including the OCIP addendum, to
which the deceased employee was a third-party beneficiary.7 Interpreted, those provisions required the general contractor and subcontractors to require their subcontractors to have the insurance coverages
specified on the OCIP addendum.' Because the automobile insurance
was specified on the OCIP addendum and "all participants" included
Pitts, the court concluded that the employee was an intended third-party
beneficiary."1
Although the general contract and OCIP addendum do not consistently
use "OCIP,"' the court's conclusion, certainly as a matter of law, seems
questionable for at least two reasons. First, the "all participants"
language is not in the section of the OCIP addendum that addresses
automobile coverage that was to be provided by the contractors but is in

74. Id. at 229, 735 S.E.2d at 780 (majority opinion).
75. Estate of Pitts, 323 Ga. App. at 71, 746 S.E.2d at 698.
76. Id. at 71-72, 746 S.E.2d at 700.
77. Id. at 76-77, 746 S.E.2d at 703-04.
78. Id. at 80, 746 S.E.2d at 708. Significantly, the court of appeals stated also, "We do
not ignore the possibility that, in the construction industry, the term 'participants' has a
specialized meaning relating to a preexisting OCIP .... But the construction companies
have neither argued in their appellate briefs nor pointed to any parol evidence of such an
industry meaning." Id. at 80, 746 S.E.2d at 705. Because "participant" probably has a
specialized meaning with reference to OCIP policies, these arguments may have helped the
contractors.
79. Id. at 84-85, 746 S.E.2d at 708.
80. Id. at 86, 746 S.E.2d at 708.
81. Id. at 85-86, 746 S.E.2d at 709.
82. Arguably, the "(nlotwithstanding anything to the contrary" language at the
beginning of the summary part of the 0P
addendum rendered moot some of the
inconsistency in the use of "OCIP" in the general contract. See id. at 76, 746 S.E.2d at 703.
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a separate section addressing other specific coverages that the city was
to have provided as part of the OCIP program." Notwithstanding the
separate coverages and separate responsible parties addressed in those
separate sections, the court of appeals chose to incorporate the "all
participants" language into the section of the OCIP addendum that
It did that based on its seemingly
addresses automobile coverage.'
erroneous construction of the OCIP addendum as addressing only "one
master insurance program" rather than one master insurance program
to have been supplemented by the city and other insurance policies,
including automobile coverage, provided by the contractors.85
Second, the automobile coverage required to be provided by the
contractors was coverage "from claims" covered by automobile insurance." The contractor and subcontractor argued that Pitts could not
be a third-party beneficiary of that coverage because the coverage was
described with reference to the claims from which the insured would be
protected, rather than the claims for which a tort claimant could
recover.8 7 The court of appeals acknowledged the general rule that
"tort claimants are not treated as third[-]party beneficiaries of insurance
policies,"" but nevertheless concluded that the "all participants"
language from "the summary provision of the OCIP addendum expressly
describes the beneficiaries in a broad manner that encompasses such tort
It will not be surprising if the supreme court grants
claimants."
certiorari to review this court of appeals decision.
IX.

GEORGIA FALSE CLAIMS ACT

The Georgia False Claims Act (the "Act")o became effective July 1,
2012.91 Those dealing with either the state of Georgia or local governments, or contractors dealing with those entities, need to be aware of its
terms. Under the Act, any person that
[kinowingly presents or causes to be presented a false or fraudulent
claim for payment or approval [to a state or local government or to a
contractor dealing with these entities, or] [kinowingly makes, uses, or
causes to be made or used a false record or statement material to a

83. Id. at 81-82, 746 S.E.2d at 703-04.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 85-86, 746 S.E.2d at 709.
Id. at 86, 746 S.E.2d at 709.
Id. at 77-78, 746 S.E.2d at 704.
Id. at 81-82, 746 S.E.2d at 709.
Id.
Id. at 86, 746 S.E.2d at 709.
O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-120 to -127.
Id.
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false or fraudulent claim[, is] liable to the State of Georgia for a civil
penalty of not less than $5,500.00 and not more than $11,000.00 for
each false or fraudulent claim, plus [, as a general rule] three times the
amount of damages [that] the state or local government sustains
because of the act of such person.'
A "claim" is defined to include "any request or demand, whether under
a contract or otherwise, for money or property."3 Under the Act,
"knowingly" includes not only actual knowledge of information, but also
deliberate ignorance of and "reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of
the information."94

92. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-121(a).
93. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-120(1).
94. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-120(2).

